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Against ‘comparative method’: explaining
similarities and differences
maurice adams and john griffiths
About 30 years ago there was much talk that geologists ought only to
observe and not theorize; and I well remember someone saying that at
this rate a man might as well go into a gravel-pit and count the pebbles
and describe the colors. How odd it is that anyone should not see that all
observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service.
(Darwin, Letter to Fawcett, 1861)
Introduction
All scientific work begins with a question about the world we live in.
Questions go before methods, and until one has specified what the ques-
tion is, no sensible discussion of methodology is possible. Trying to find
‘a methodology’ for something that is not a question – like ‘comparative
law’ – is like looking for ‘a methodology’ for pebble-counting. Not, as
Darwin would say, ‘of any service’. Legal comparison, like pebble-
counting, is itself a method – a way of answering questions. Actually
it is a whole collection of methods that may be helpful in seeking answers
to a variety of sorts of questions about law. What legal comparison entails
in a concrete situation depends on the sort of question one wants to try
to answer.
It may be useful to identify here some examples of the sorts of questions
about law to which corresponding sorts of comparative method might be
addressed.
 What is the law of some other social group (e.g. a state) on a given point
and how does it differ technically from the domestic law of one’s own
group or state? This sort of legal comparison is primarily of interest
to practicing lawyers and judges (‘private international law’), colonial
administrators (‘customary law’), and law reformers (especially those
promoting ‘unification’ of some sort).
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280 maurice adams and john griffiths
 How does a legal culture develop, diffuse, influence other legal cultures,
and so forth? And what are the implicit cultural assumptions of lawyers,
judges, legislators and legal scholars? Legal texts can be examined for
evidence related to such questions. Thus a good deal of the work of legal
historians, for example historians of Roman law, is essentially philolog-
ical in character. A similar concentration on legal texts is characteristic
of some practitioners of Critical Legal Studies.
 How can similarities and differences – between societies and over time –
in the (‘legal’) regulation of particular sorts of behavior and in the social
practices governed by such regulation, be explained? It is ‘comparative
law’ in the service of sociological explanation to which the rest of this
chapter will be addressed.
If one begins with a question (and a certain body of theory: accumu-
lated insight surrounding the question), methodological questions tend
to answer themselves (which, as we will see, does not mean the answers
make life easy). When comparing domestic and foreign law, the method
used will mostly vary along the spectrum from formalism (‘law on the
books’) through legal realism (‘law in practice’), to various sorts of ‘func-
tional’ comparison, depending on the task at hand. A philologist inter-
ested in texts and their diffusion and influence will use all of the technical
apparatus of philology to trace borrowings, differences, and so forth, but
if he is appropriately modest he will not suppose that textual similarities
or differences tell him much about how the people concerned actually
interpreted the texts, nor what they did with the rules as they understood
them. A sociologist of law who seeks to explain why the procurement of
organs for transplantation is much less successful in France than it is in
Spain – although the legal arrangements in the two countries are essen-
tially similar (‘presumed consent’) – will collect detailed field information
in the two countries about the concrete social context of ‘intensive care
units’ to which the respective rules apply and about how the respective
laws are being interpreted and used in practice.1 There is, to repeat, no
single ‘comparative method’ because there is no single question.
It is in connection with this last point that the title of this chapter, which
is of course also meant as a teaser, alludes to Paul Feyerabend’s classic
Against Method.2 Feyerabend’s argument was much more far-reaching
1 See G. Nowenstein, The Generosity of the Dead: A Sociology of Organ Procurement in France
(London: Ashgate Publishing, 2010).
2 P. Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (London:
Verso, 1975).
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against ‘comparative method’ 281
than ours here. But we follow his lead in arguing that there is no such
thing as a single method which, applied as a sort of recipe, will lead to the
right results.
The book on which this contribution is based – Euthanasia and Law
in Europe3 – is the fruit of an interdisciplinary and international research
project on the regulation of ‘Medical Behaviour that Potentially Shortens
Life’ (hereafter: MBPSL).4 It can be considered a study in ‘comparative
law’, since we were dealing with law and its use in practice, and the way
we went about doing what we did was to a considerable extent that of
comparison. We concentrated first and foremost on the Netherlands and
Belgium, comparing them and their respective paths of legal development
as regards the legalization of euthanasia5 and closely related other forms of
MBPSL (such as withdrawal of treatment and terminal sedation). Along
the way we compared these two countries, which were the first explicitly
to legalize euthanasia, with eight other European countries6 which (with
the partial exception of Switzerland7) have not (yet) done so.
Our questions
What does ‘comparative law’ entail in such a case? To answer this question
we first have to be more specific about the questions we wanted to answer.
These were many, but in short we wanted to know what, if any, rules (‘legal’
3 J. Griffiths, H. Weyers and M. Adams, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2008).
4 See on this research program (now referred to as ‘RSPMB’): www.rug.nl/rechten/rspmb.
5 Unless otherwise clear from the context, we use the term ‘euthanasia’ to include both
euthanasia in the narrow sense (killing another at his request, in particularly when done
by a doctor) and assisted suicide (particularly when this assistance is provided by a doctor).
6 England and Wales, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. The Scandinavian countries
(Denmark, Norway and Sweden) were for the purposes of the book treated together.
There was not much rigorous method to our selection of countries (apart from the choice
to limit the book to Europe). The following criteria played a role: in what countries
was the question of legalizing euthanasia (or of related sorts of medical behavior such
as administering potentially lethal pain relief or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment)
known to us to be a matter of public/political debate? In what countries was there legal and
empirical material available for purposes of the sort of comparison we wanted to make? In
what countries did we have access to local colleagues whom we could trust to provide the
sort of legally and empirically reliable information we were interested in? These criteria
identified one country not included in the book but which certainly should have been:
Germany.
7 In Switzerland, assisted suicide is not illegal so long as it is not a doctor who gives the
assistance (volunteers working for lay organizations do this). For further information, see
the chapter on Switzerland in, Euthanasia and Law in Europe, pp. 463–481.
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282 maurice adams and john griffiths
and otherwise) apply to MBPSL, and how ‘euthanasia’ is separated out
from the other MBPSL for special treatment. We also wanted to know
what the rules (as locally interpreted) are taken to mean and why this
is so, and what accounts for their similarities and differences. Then we
wanted to know when and how the rules are used in medical (and other)
practice and what sorts of social effects such use has (e.g. for the ‘safety’ of
patients; and whether there is evidence of a ‘slippery slope’). We further
sought to understand why legalization of euthanasia has so far occurred
in the Netherlands and Belgium (and recently, Luxembourg), and not
elsewhere, and what such legalization has entailed. A final important
question concerned the more general context in which legalization of
euthanasia is taking place: is euthanasia an example of increasing liberty
for doctors and patients, or rather one of increasing legal control? So
you might say that we were interested in: (a) the legal norms (broadly
understood) concerned and how they have changed in recent years, (b)
their social effects, and (c) explanations for the similarities and differences
of the norms and their effects in different jurisdictions. Our reason for
doing all this in a comparative manner was not just idle curiosity. It was
based in the wisdom of the observation that, ‘He who knows one society
knows no society.’8
Although we deal here only with the specific subject matter of our book,
we nevertheless believe that the comparative methodology employed
applies more generally to all research projects with similar purposes.9
Our approach
To be able to do all this we adopted an approach that can be summarized
as ‘casting the net wide’. This phrase refers metaphorically not only to the
fact that we had set ourselves ambitious and far-reaching goals for which a
broad approach was inevitable, but also to the fact that even more limited
8 A. Köbben, ‘De vergelijkende methode in de volkenkunde’, in A. Köbben, Van primitieven
tot medeburgers (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974), p. 24 (quoting Fahrenfort). Quite apart from
all this, we also wanted to provide (practicing) lawyers with a complete and accurate
account of current law, and policy makers in other countries with as full a description
as possible of what a system of legalized euthanasia looks like (in the Netherlands and
Belgium).
9 A similar methodology, especially as far as the first three parts of our research project was
concerned (next section, ‘Cast the net wide’, parts 1–3), can be found in V. V. Palmer,
‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’, American
Journal of Comparative Law, 53 (2005), 276–281 (setting out the methodology used in the
Trento Common Core Project on ‘Pure Economic Loss in Europe’).
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against ‘comparative method’ 283
goals would have required a broad perspective. Thus, for example, living
up to the goal of identifying the relevant rules required a broad approach
to what count as ‘legal’ rules in the context of medical practice at the end
of life.
In what follows we set out how we went about all this. Illustrations come
mostly from the book itself (and we have not considered it necessary to
cite chapter and verse for each of them).
Cast the net wide (part 1): functionalism
The approach we took to comparison had as its starting point a functional
scheme. The term ‘functional’ is however prone to misunderstanding
because of its varied meanings in different contexts,10 and – in a compar-
ative law context – because of the simplistic and unfortunate use of the
term by K. Zweigert and H. Kötz in their influential treatise on compar-
ative law.11 For them ‘functionalism’ refers, among many other things, to
the fact that legal rules must be ‘seen purely in the light of their function, as
10 In the social sciences, ‘functionalism’ generally refers (whether or not explicitly and
consciously) to the idea that ‘the consequences of some behavior or social arrangement
are essential elements of the causes of that behavior’ (see A. L. Stinchcombe, Constructing
Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) for an unusually careful
analysis and discussion of the circumstances in which a functional explanation may be
appropriate). In the form of ‘structural functionalism’ the idea is that a structural element
of a social system is essential to the maintenance of the system as a whole. The tendency
among sociological ‘functionalists’ is to assume that once a ‘function’ has been attributed
to a social institution, that institution actually does have the effects attributed to it. And
the attribution of ‘functions’ tends to have an at least latent normative foundation. Thus
the ‘function’ of maintaining social order is often attributed to ‘law’ (whatever that term
may refer to) and the existence of ‘law’ is thought to be explained by the fact that some
degree of social order seems to obtain. We do not assume here that ‘law’ (or ‘a law’) has
any particular ‘function’ nor that the existence of law can be explained in such terms; nor
do we claim that law succeeds in realizing the functions attributed to it (whether by the
lawgiver or the sociologist).
11 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press,
1998), p. 34 ff. Glendon et al. not only state that the principle of functionality in com-
parative law is now recognized to have wide applicability, but also that it is ‘proba-
bly comparative law’s principal gift to twentieth century legal science’. M. A. Glendon,
M. W. Gordon and P. G. Carozza, Comparative Legal Traditions (in a Nutshell) (St Paul:
West Group, 1999), p. 9. The first full scale criticism of this sort of functionalism in
comparative law is G. Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative
Law,’ Harvard International Law Journal, 26 (1985), 411–455. For a critical overview
article, see M. Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’, in P. Legrand and R. Munday
(eds.), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press,
2004), pp. 100–126. For important qualifications, see J. Husa, ‘Farewell to Functional-
ism or Methodological Tolerance?’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales
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284 maurice adams and john griffiths
an attempt to satisfy a particular legal need’.12 According to Zweigert and
Kötz ‘functionalism’ builds on ‘what every comparatist learns, namely
that the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems,
and solves these problems by quite different means though very often
with similar results’.13 Law is everywhere, so they claim, a mechanism that
has the ‘function’ of solving universal ‘problems of life’.14
Such a broad use of the idea of ‘function’ confuses what a rule does
as a matter of fact (‘solves those problems’) with (legislative) purpose
(‘attempt to satisfy a particular legal need’). Apart from the fact, obvious
all around us, that there is no one-on-one relationship between the ‘pur-
pose’ someone attributes to a rule and what the effects of the rule really are,
the very notion that law ‘everywhere attempts to solve universal “prob-
lems of life”’ is: (1) anthropomorphic – law does not ‘attempt’ anything;
(2) many times not true – much law simply offers facilities and is indif-
ferent whether they are used; (3) not true for another reason (unless the
idea of ‘universal problems’ is made so abstract as to be meaningless) –
in what sense do Minangkabau rules of matrilineal descent solve any uni-
versal problem? It simply doesn’t make sense to speak of problems that
are common to and ‘solved’ by ‘law’ in all societies. Furthermore, the
whole causal problem-solving approach runs foul of Renner’s observa-
tion that the contents of a body of law and its ‘social functions’ can be
largely indifferent to each other.15 The Roman law of property prevailed
(formally) in Rome, in the middle ages (feudalism), for early bourgeois
personal ownership, and under modern corporate capitalism – thus serv-
ing four vastly different economic ‘functions’ with virtually unchanged
legal texts! It is not, so it seems, a legal rule itself, but rather the social cir-
cumstances, that determine how and when, and to what ends, the rule is
used.16
For us the idea of ‘function’ was just an analytic tool that makes it pos-
sible to achieve some kind of comparability in the rules, the institutions
Privatrecht, 67 (2003), 419–447; and J. De Coninck, ‘The Functional Method of Compar-
ative Law: Quo Vadis?’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht,
74 (2010), 318–350.
12 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, p. 34.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 K. Renner, Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts und ihre soziale Funktion (1929). The
English edition is edited by O. Kahn Freund and published as: Institutions of Private Law
and their Social Functions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949).
16 See J. Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Legal Rules’, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 48 (2003),
1–84.
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against ‘comparative method’ 285
and the behavior with which we were concerned.17 Modern European
healthcare systems are broadly similar and the roles doctors in different
countries play at the end of a patient’s life involve at most minor varia-
tions within a common basic structure.18 To identify the (legal) rules to
be compared, we could therefore begin with this body of largely similar
behavior.19 We were also able to describe this behavior with a classifi-
catory framework that seemed as neutral as possible as between the ten
countries we were dealing with. It was important, of course, that in doing
so we not make ‘false comparisons’: comparing ‘dissimilar data . . . as
if they were similar’.20 Our descriptive framework must thus not force
medical behavior in the ten systems onto a Procrustean bed formed by
the normative (‘folk concepts’) classifications proper to only one system
when identifying the behavioral situations whose regulation we wanted
to compare.21 Unfortunately – and this is an important limitation of any
17 Compare R. Michaels, ‘The Functional Method in Comparative Law’, in M. Reimann and
R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University
Press, 2006), p. 366. The expression ‘factual approach’ would perhaps be better than
‘functional approach’, but since functionalism is the household name in the comparative
law literature we stick to it.
18 If there is no minimum of similarity in the topic to be researched in different jurisdictions,
doing comparative law is simply not feasible. In that sense, and contrary to popular
opinion, apples and oranges can indeed be compared: as fruit! But when there is only
comparability at a high level of abstraction, one can wonder to what end comparison
would be meaningful at all. Without any information about the problem to be addressed
and the accompanying research questions, it is hardly possible to say anything sensible
about this.
19 Compare the approach to comparative law developed by R. A. Kagan in ‘How Much Does
Law Matter? Labor Law, Competition, and Waterfront Labor Relations in Rotterdam and
US Ports’, Law and Society Review, 24 (1990), 35–69; R. A. Kagan and L. Axelrad (eds.),
Regulatory Encounters: Multinational Corporations and Adversarial Legalism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000) and R. A. Kagan, N. Gunningham and D. Thorton,
Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, Environment (Stanford University Press, 2003).
20 On ‘false comparisons’ in comparative law, see J. van Velsen, ‘Procedural Informality,
Reconciliation, and False Comparisons’, in M. Gluckman (ed.), Ideas and Procedures in
African Customary Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 137–52.
21 On ‘folk concepts’ see the classic debate between Gluckman and Bohannan, who disagreed
about the concepts used to describe another legal system (Gluckman used Roman and
English legal concepts to describe Barotse law; Bohannan argued that the use of such
foreign concepts inevitably distorts legal reality). See P. Bohannan, ‘Review of The Ideas
in Barotse Jurisprudence’, Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers, 36 (1967), pp. 94–101;
M. Gluckman, The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence, 2nd edn (Manchester University Press,
1967) (first published in 1965 as the Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence at Yale Law School)
and ‘Reappraisal’, in The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia),
2nd edn (Manchester University Press, 1967), first published in 1955. Compare, from the
Dutch adat-law tradition, B. ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia, 1st edn (1939) (in Dutch,
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286 maurice adams and john griffiths
comparative research project – outside of mathematics and purely arti-
ficial languages there are no descriptive terms available that do not run
the risk of normative bias.22 One must therefore proceed in a spirit of
conceptual tentativeness, seeking continuously to smoke out normative
preconceptions, replacing the terms concerned with others that permit a
better comparison. Objective neutral classification of the behavior to be
compared is a matter of aspiration, since whatever terms one uses will
inevitably carry traces of the normative preoccupations of those who use
the natural language from which they derive. As with all other classifica-
tions of behavior, our framework was (and is) always subject to correction
in the light of better insight. From that point of view it was not only the
starting point of our research (in the form of an hypothetical analytic
framework), but also (in revised form) a product of the research.23
As we have noted, the ‘functional’ framework we used to identify and
describe the legal regulation of MBPSL in the Netherlands and Belgium
(and in the eight other countries treated more briefly), has as its point of
departure not the rules themselves but the behavior (mostly of doctors)
that they purport to regulate. We sought to classify the rules in which
we were ultimately interested according to their applicability to various
parts of the whole range of ‘medical behavior that potentially shortens
life’. The questions the framework is intended to address are these: what,
English translation by E. A. Hoebel and A. A. Schiller (New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1948)).
Of all ‘folk concepts’ probably the most dangerous is ‘law’ (and its equivalents in other
languages), reflecting, as it always inescapably does, the normative preoccupations of a
society which distinguishes the ‘legal’ from the ‘non-legal’ in its own peculiar way. The
danger of distortion involved in the use of ‘folk concepts’, it should be emphasized, is
not limited to comparative work. They are perhaps even more insidious in the case of
observation of and reflection on one’s own system.
22 Van Tol’s research on the classification of MBPSL by Dutch doctors and prosecutors shows
convincingly how strong the ‘cognitive solidarity’ of such social groups affects the way
they classify behavior – doctors having quite a different view from that of prosecutors as to
what constitutes ‘euthanasia’, for example. See D. van Tol, ‘Grensgeschillen. Een rechtsso-
ciologisch onderzoek naar het classificeren van euthanasie en ander medisch handelen
rond het levenseinde’, dissertation, University of Groningen (2005), summarized very
briefly in Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, Euthanasia and Law in Europe, pp. 203–204.
23 An example of the sort of classificatory cumulative insight we have in mind concerns a
recent newcomer to the world of (acknowledged) MBPSL: palliative/terminal sedation.
While it is possible to analyze these as a combination of pain relief and withholding
treatment, it seems increasingly clear that to do so is to oversimplify. A more adequate
comparison of the regulation applicable to MBPSL than is reflected in the table below
would probably have to include a separate category for this sort of behaviour.
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against ‘comparative method’ 287
if any, rules apply to (one or another sort of) medical behavior that
potentially shortens life? And how is ‘euthanasia’ separated out for special
treatment?
In the jurisdictions we were concerned with, many things doctors do
can knowingly cause the death of a patient (in most countries, roughly half
of all deaths take place in this way). Like other people, doctors can commit
murder or cause someone’s death by careless driving. But our study was
not concerned with such situations, where the fact that the actor is a
doctor is irrelevant as far as the legal consequences of his behavior are
concerned. Nor did we deal with everything a doctor does as a doctor
that causes a patient’s death: in particular, medical negligence that leads
to so-called iatrogenic death – that is, death due to medical mistakes –
was not part of our subject. What we were concerned with were deaths
that are not an accident, not the result of negligence, nor the untoward
consequences of taking justifiable risks in pursuing legitimate curative or
palliative objectives, but the outcome of medical behavior in which the
doctor engages expecting the behavior to lead to the earlier death of the
patient. It is possible to define this category in two ways: ‘subjectively’ (in
terms of what the doctor involved actually anticipated) or ‘objectively’ (in
terms of what a reasonable doctor would have anticipated). Both for legal
and for scientific purposes, there is rarely any way to know what a doctor
‘actually’ anticipated other than by taking his word for it or assuming
he anticipated what others in his position would have anticipated. Since
self-reports of the reasons for behavior are notoriously unreliable,24 the
choice for an objective approach was easily taken.
MBPSL thus consists of a number of sorts of medical behavior that can
be distinguished in (largely) behavioral terms common to the systems of
medical end-of-life care we are concerned with, as shown in the left-hand
column in Table 13.1 below. The right-hand column shows the general
legal category under which such behavior falls in Dutch and Belgian law
(but not necessarily in that of any other country).
Taking the various sorts of MBPSL in order, from the top of Table 13.1
down, the legal situation in the Netherlands and Belgium is, very gener-
ally speaking, as follows. If a patient refuses life-prolonging treatment, his
doctor is obliged to comply, and this also applies to the situation of a cur-
rently non-competent patient who, when he was competent, expressed the
24 Cf. R. C. Lewontin, ‘Sex, Lies, and Social Science’, New York Review of Books (20 April
1995).
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288 maurice adams and john griffiths
Table 13.1
Varieties of end-of-life medical behavior
Behavioral category Legal categorization in Dutch and
Belgian law
honoring patient’s refusal of
treatment (current or in treatment
directive)





‘medical exception’ to criminal
prohibitions for ‘normal medical
practice’
pain relief with life-shortening effect
euthanasia justification of necessity (Netherlands
until 2002) or explicit legalization
physician-assisted suicide (PAS)




refusal in the form of a so-called ‘treatment directive’.25 Abstention from
life-prolonging treatment on grounds of ‘medical futility’, and admin-
istration of indicated doses of pain relief despite the fact that this may
hasten the death of the patient, are considered ‘normal medical practice’
and fall within the so-called ‘medical exception’ that permits a doctor to
do things (such as surgery or turning off a respirator) that in the case
of a non-doctor would be criminal offenses.26 ‘Termination of life’ is in
principle homicide (murder or the like). However, if done by a doctor
at the explicit request of the patient, ‘euthanasia’ (including ‘physician-
assisted suicide’) has been made legal in Belgium and the Netherlands.
Termination of life in the absence of a request can also be legally justifi-
able in the Netherlands (but not in Belgium) in some narrowly-defined
circumstances (e.g. neonates).
As far as the legal justification of euthanasia is concerned, a short
explanatory note on the difference between the Netherlands and Belgium
is necessary and illustrative. In the Netherlands, euthanasia and assisted
25 See generally on treatment directives, C. Vezzoni, Advance Treatment Directives and
Autonomy for Incompetent Patients (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 2008). Such instruments
are often called ‘advance directives’ but for reasons explained by Vezzoni, the term
‘treatment directive’ is more precise.
26 See Euthanasia and Law in Europe, pp. 55–56.
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against ‘comparative method’ 289
suicide were until 2002 explicitly and apparently absolutely prohibited by
two articles of the Dutch Penal Code. Despite the forbidding text of these
two articles, the Supreme Court held in the Schoonheim case in 198427
that a doctor can rely on the defense of justification due to necessity if he
administers the necessary drugs (euthanatica) to a patient who asks him
to do so and whose suffering is ‘unbearable and hopeless’. The justification
of necessity is provided for in article 40 of the Dutch Penal Code, which
states that an actor is not guilty of an offence if it was ‘the result of a force
he could not be expected to resist [overmacht]’. Although article 40 looks
on its face like an excuse, since 1923 it has been interpreted to include the
justification that the act took place in a situation in which the actor has to
make a choice between two conflicting duties. Based on this existing doc-
trine, the Supreme Court held in the Schoonheim case that a doctor who,
confronted by the request of a patient who is unbearably and hopelessly
suffering, can be regarded as caught in such a situation of conflict of
duties. On the one hand, there is the duty to respect life, as reflected in the
Dutch Penal Code. On the other hand, there is the doctor’s duty to relieve
suffering. If, the Supreme Court held, a doctor confronted by such a con-
flict of duties, chooses a course of action that, considering the norms of
medical ethics, is ‘objectively’ justifiable, he is not guilty of an offence. In
the period following the Schoonheim case the courts, generally following
the lead of the Royal Dutch Medical Association, worked out the ‘require-
ments of due care’ that must be followed in such a case. Only in 2002,
more than fifteen years after Schoonheim, did legislation on euthanasia
become effective. In effect it ratified the solutions arrived at by the
courts.
In Belgium, euthanasia was illegal until 2002, when legislation was
passed legalizing it. Before that time, it undoubtedly took place in actual
medical practice, but unlike the Netherlands there had never been a
prosecution in which the possibility of a legal justification could be tested.
Because of this, it was (and is) not known, for example, whether the
justification of necessity, as accepted by the Dutch Supreme Court in the
case of euthanasia, might also be applicable in Belgium (for example, in
a situation not covered by the law of 2002).
It is precisely the lack of prior case law and practical experience in
Belgium that also helps to explain why the Belgian Euthanasia Act,28
27 Dutch Supreme Court, 27 November 1984, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985, no. 106.
28 For an English translation see: www.kuleuven.ac.be/cbmer/viewpic.php?LAN=E&
TABLE=DOCS&ID=23 (accessed 12 September 2010). Also in European Journal of Health
Law, 10 (2003), 329.
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unlike its Dutch counterpart,29 contains so many detailed provisions.
Because legislation took place in a situation that was legally hardly pre-
structured (with as a result much legal uncertainty), it was felt necessary
to create legal certainty by means of extensive legislation.
To recapitulate: Given purposes such as ours, meaningful comparison
must be functional in the sense that one begins with behavioral categories
and uses these to identify the legal rules (broadly taken) applicable to such
categories of behavior in the jurisdictions being compared.
Cast the net wide (part 2): what concept of legal sources and law?
Our approach to comparison was also non-formalistic. We do not have
to take a position on the question whether such an approach would be
necessary in every area of law (although it certainly can be useful in many
other comparative research projects), but in studying the law concerning
euthanasia and the other MBPSL, even in one country but certainly when
one engages in comparison, it is for several reasons essential to take
broadly the concept of what constitutes a legal source or a legal rule. For
us, the concept of legal sources must be taken to mean ‘everything that
shapes or helps to shape the law’.30
For example, in the regulation of everyday medical practice, in particu-
lar as such regulation develops and changes, there is a great deal of relevant
data that goes beyond formal ‘legal’ texts such as statutes or judicial deci-
sions. These are preceded, surrounded and given meaning, and followed
by a vast amount of ‘para-legal’ sources of law. It would, in every country
we know of, be impossible to state what the law ‘is’, let alone what it will be
tomorrow, without taking account of – to name a few of the most obvious
and important other sources of law – parliamentary reports (such as that
of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the
Terminally Ill Bill), reports of official advisory committees (such as those
of the French National Ethics Committee), reports of state commissions
and the like (such as the Dutch State Commission on Euthanasia, which
among other things settled the terminological question of the distinction
between ‘euthanasia’ and other MBPSL).
29 For an English translation see: www.healthlaw.nl/wtlovhz eng.pdf (accessed 12 Septem-
ber 2010).
30 K. Zweigert, ‘Zur Methode der Rechtsvergleichung,’ Studium Generale, 13 (1961), 196,
quoted by S. Vogenauer, ‘Sources of Law and Legal Method’, in M. Reimann and R.
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University
Press, 2006), p. 879. The word ‘law’ in the quote from Zweigert apparently refers only to
state law.
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against ‘comparative method’ 291
Of particular importance in a highly developed system of regulation
of euthanasia such as that in the Netherlands (but less so in Belgium,
among other reasons because the Belgian statute is far more detailed
than the Dutch statute) is the fact that legal sources include various pro-
fessional documents whose pedigree is not, strictly speaking, ‘legal’, but
which are generally followed by the courts, prosecutors and other legal
authorities. On crucial matters such as the ‘requirements of due care’,
appropriate euthanatica, and the extent to which nurses may be involved
in the administration of euthanasia, the position formulated in various
documents by the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) has been
authoritative. More recently, the legitimacy of and requirements for pal-
liative sedation have effectively been settled by a national guideline issued
by the KNMG. Similarly, national guidelines of specialist organizations
have largely fixed the rules governing physician-assisted suicide in the
case of psychiatric patients (Dutch Association for Psychiatry) and for
withholding treatment and termination of life in neonatology (Dutch
Association for Pediatrics). A particularly interesting illustration of the
importance of formal statements by professional organizations in the reg-
ulation of medical behavior is the case of Switzerland: while assistance
with suicide is not a criminal offence (unless done for a selfish motive),
the very limited involvement of doctors in Swiss institutionalized practice,
and hence the central role of volunteer organizations that give the actual
assistance, is based on the position of the organized medical profession
concerning medical ethics. A further consequence is that regulation of
the practice of assistance is largely to be found in the internal rules of
the lay organizations, which determine, for example, eligibility for their
services.
There are also low-visibility ‘legal’ sources that give specific content to
the statutory provisions. The ‘case law’ of the Dutch and Belgian Review
Committees has effectively settled a number of very important questions
concerning the interpretation of the euthanasia statutes in the two coun-
tries. In the Netherlands for example, current regulation of the question
how much prior relationship a doctor must have with a patient who
requests euthanasia is to be found in the ‘case law’ of the Review Com-
mittees. An interesting Belgian example is provided by the question of the
legality of physician-assisted suicide. Unlike its Dutch counterpart, the
Belgian Law on Euthanasia does not expressly apply to physician-assisted
suicide. On the face of it this seems surprising. It is generally accepted that
the differences between euthanasia on the one hand and assisted suicide
on the other, are ethically minimal. It would seem logical for both forms of
termination of life to be tied to the same legal standards. Why regulate the
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‘greater’ but not the ‘lesser’? From the point of view of patient autonomy
and of societal control, assisted suicide is probably preferable to euthana-
sia, and such a preference could easily have been built into the Law. The
issue was settled by the Belgian Review Commission. In its first biennial
evaluation report, in September 2004, the Commission simply stated that
it considered physician-assisted suicide to fall within the definition of
euthanasia.31 Since the Commission’s assessment of cases reported to it
is in effect final, unless it finds that the doctor did not conform to the
legal requirements, this ‘interpretation’ of the statute by the Commission
is effectively final too.
Another not quite fully ‘legal’ source of relevant rules consists of prose-
cutorial guidelines. In the Netherlands, the relevant guideline concerning
prosecution of cases in which a doctor is found by a Review Committee
not to have followed all the (statutory) requirements of due care, while
largely unknown outside the prosecutorial service, in effect repairs some
unfortunate mistakes made in the drafting of the euthanasia statute (e.g.
where the statute subjects the failure to report a case of euthanasia to
the same criminal liability as that for performance of illegal euthanasia:
the guideline provides that such cases do not usually call for criminal
prosecution). Recently, in the United Kingdom, the Director of Public
Prosecutions has issued a guideline which in effect regulates the practice
of helping a person to travel to Switzerland for assisted suicide.32
In casting the net wide, however, it is not enough to take account of
the sort of ‘para-legal’ sources we have been describing. One also has to
take account of the fact that issues that have been regulated by official
‘state’ law in one country, might be regulated in other ways in other
countries. Moreover, comparative law for our purposes requires that one
also looks to the informal law (‘norms’, if one prefers) of the social groups
to whom the relevant actors belong. Certainly in our domain this is true:
an important part of the regulation of medical behavior takes place in
the form of social rules of the medical profession itself. Some of these are
‘para-legal’ and have been noted above. Others, however, are non-legal
(such as the rules of Swiss assisted suicide organizations) or even contra
legem. Nowenstein has shown, to use an example from a closely related area
of medical practice, that the success of the Spanish ‘presumed consent’ law
31 Premier Rapport aux Chambres Législatives / Eerste Verslag aan de Wetgevende Kamers [First
Report for the Legislative Chambers], Parliamentary Proceeding, Senate and Chamber of
Representatives, 2003–2004, 3–860/1 (Senate); DOC 51 1374/001 (Chamber).
32 See P. Lewis, ‘Unfinished Business’, The Solicitors Journal, 153:37 (2009), 11.
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against ‘comparative method’ 293
concerning procurement of organs for transplantation, and the failure of
the equivalent French law, is the result of strikingly different norms in the
two medical professions relating to the interaction of medical personnel
with the family of a ‘brain dead’ patient.33 Similarly, although French law
absolutely prohibits ‘active termination of life’ in neonatology, the social
norms among neonatologists in France result in such medical behavior
being far more frequent than in the Netherlands, where it is legal in very
narrow circumstances but tightly regulated by professional guidelines;
and whereas Dutch medical norms (reflected in the guidelines referred
to) absolutely require close involvement of the parents in such cases, as
well as in the much more common case of withholding of treatment,
and research shows that the official norms are essentially always followed,
in France involvement of the parents is apparently very rare.34 In short,
comparing the way medical behavior is regulated in different countries
requires that one take account not only of formal ‘legal’ rules but also of
the applicable professional norms.
Cast the net wide (part 3): engaging social and institutional context
in the interpretation of legal norms
The problems the law addresses and the rules which it provides for deal-
ing with these problems are always embedded in a particular social and
institutional context. In our case this meant that it was important to
study the rules concerning euthanasia and other MBPSL in a multilayered
way. The rules themselves were the first layer, and we paid careful and
detailed attention to them. But without taking account of their historical,
institutional, political, cultural and social environment, their meaning
cannot be understood. The second and third layers of comparison, in our
case, concerned specifically the health care system within which the rules
were situated, and more generally the political culture and constitutional
background of the legal system of which all this is a part. In effect, we
were thus engaged in (comparative) institutional and political sociology.
Thus anyone who, for example, wants to know what the Belgian legal
rules on euthanasia mean will find that this is to large degree deter-
mined by the institutional structure and legal culture in which they are
33 See Nowenstein, The Generosity of the Dead.
34 Compare A. Paillet, Sauver la vie, donner la mort. Une sociologie de l’éthique en réanimation
néonatal (Paris: La Dispute, 2007) with S. Moratti, ‘“Medical Futility” in Dutch Neonatol-
ogy’, dissertation, University of Groningen (2009); cf. also Euthanasia and Law in Europe,
pp. 246–249.
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embedded. A good example of this is the debate about the alleged existence
of a right to euthanasia. Article 14 of the Belgian Euthanasia Act clearly
provides that a doctor may refuse to perform euthanasia on grounds of
conscience. There is no such thing as a subjective right to euthanasia in
the sense that a patient can demand euthanasia from a specific doctor. Yet
there are differing opinions among lawyers and doctors, and among the
public, about the meaning of article 14.
Proponents of a right to euthanasia argue that because the Belgian
Euthanasia Act explicitly requires that euthanasia be performed by a
doctor, it must be considered ‘normal medical behavior’. Since it is ‘normal
medical behavior’, doctors are under an obligation to perform it if the
extensive conditions listed in the Euthanasia Act are met.35
Opponents of a ‘right’ to euthanasia, on the other hand, rely heavily
on a reconstruction of the legal context in which the Euthanasia Act
should be read, situating the supposedly applicable legal norms in the
wider context of health care legislation.36 From a legal point of view, the
opinion that euthanasia is ‘normal medical behavior’ cannot be correct,
so the opponents argue, because under Belgian law medical behavior that
for non-doctors would be criminal can only be legally justified under the
Royal Decree concerning the practice of health care professionals. This
Decree provides, among other things, that a doctor has an obligation
to treat a patient when there is a medical indication for the treatment –
subject to the consent of the patient, of course. This legal justification
(and the connected obligation for the doctor) does not, however, cover
behaviour of physicians for which there is no medical indication, such as
(in most cases) abortion, removal of an organ for transplantation, non-
therapeutic medical research, and euthanasia. In other words, so these
opponents argue, to justify these medical activities specific legalisation
is required. It is the Euthanasia Act itself that creates a specific legal
justification for euthanasia, but not a right to it. To the opponents the
distinction between medically-indicated treatment and medical behavior
that is legal but not medically indicated37 clearly implies that euthanasia
cannot be considered ‘normal medical behavior’.
35 See for this and other arguments, E. De Keyser, ‘Euthanasie: een medische handeling?’,
Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad (2003), 1067–73.
36 H. Nys, ‘Euthanasie is geen medische handeling’, Acta Hospitalia, 4 (1999), 71–72 and
H. Nys, ‘Euthanasie in de Caritasziekenhuizen: een juridische verheldering’, Ethische
Perspectieven, 1 (2002), 29–31.
37 The distinction was accepted by the Belgian Council of State in its advice on the then
pending euthanasia Bill. Parliamentary Proceedings, Senate, 1999–2000, 2–244/21.
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Differences of opinion continue to date, but the key to understanding
and possibly even resolving this matter lies in the political and societal
context, and ultimately revolves around the mainly ideological question
of whether Catholic hospitals may prohibit doctors in their employ from
performing euthanasia: if euthanasia is not a subjective right, hospitals
might be free to do so. The answer to this question is not merely aca-
demic, since about 80 percent of the hospitals in Flanders (the region that
accounts for more than half of Belgium in terms of number of inhab-
itants and geographic size) are associated with Catholic organizations.
Awareness of this political and societal context is the natural habitat of
Belgian lawyers – and the population at large – when interpreting the legal
norms. They have no difficulty recognizing and understanding the inter-
ests at stake. Nevertheless, in the legal literature the matter is translated
into (some would say ‘disguised as’) an almost exclusively legal dispute.
That makes the Belgian discussion difficult for an outsider to understand.
What especially complicates matters for a comparatist is that in the
Netherlands the idea that euthanasia cannot be considered a form of
‘normal medical practice’ has been discussed in similar terms (and there
is general consensus that it is not), but in quite a different context. The
Dutch discussion has focused not on the matter of a subjective ‘right’
(for which there is little support38) but rather on the question whether a
criminal control regime for euthanasia is necessary and wise, or whether
control can be left (at least in the first instance) to the profession itself (as
is largely the case for ‘normal medical practice’). Here the discussion has
not been so much ideologically inspired (far less so than in Belgium) as
policy driven: what form of control can best meet the need for safety and
public confidence, once euthanasia is made legal?39
So what we see is two countries using similar legal arguments in a seem-
ingly similar debate but with quite different practical implications and
motivations. It is especially when foreign legal systems and circumstances
seem familiar and even self-evident that the comparative researcher can
38 Griffiths is a partial exception. Many years ago he argued that while there was no duty
resting on any particular doctor (and hence no corresponding right within the doctor-
patient relationship), the fact that the medical profession had claimed, and received,
a monopoly over legal euthanasia necessarily implied that the profession should not,
ultimately, be allowed to avoid the duty of ensuring access for patients who meet the
requirements. See J. Griffiths, ‘Een toeschouwersperspectief op de euthanasiediscussie’,
Nederlands Juristenblad (1978), 681–693.
39 See J. Griffiths, A. Bood and H. Weyers, Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands (Amster-
dam University Press, 1998), pp. 285–298.
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be lead to draw ‘obvious’ but in fact superficial or misleading conclusions
as far as similarities and differences are concerned. This confirms the need
to make the socio-legal context explicit.
Cast the net wide (part 4): not just the rules but social practice as well
Finally, in making comparisons with an ultimately explanatory objective
in mind, it was important to consider not only the (legal and other)
rules, but also the social practices in which they play a part. This implies
a rejection of simplistic ‘instrumentalism’: the notion that in normal
circumstances rules are direct causes of the behavior they prescribe. The
archetypical example is driving: people keep to the right when driving
because this is what the traffic rules require and if you want them to
wear seat-belts as well, there should be a rule that requires it. In effect,
instrumentalism privileges the perspective of the rule-giver. There are
many troubles with such a view, of which perhaps the most embarrassing
is that although there has been a vast amount of research inspired by the
instrumental approach, no one has ever been able to demonstrate a direct
causal relationship between rules and behavior.40
The approach we adopted begins the other way around, privileging
the perspective of the actors on the ‘shop floor’ of social life, where
the behavior covered by a rule is taking place. Where instrumentalism
focuses, in effect, on obedience, the approach we favor asks whether and
how these actors will ‘use’ a rule – by following it, for example, or as
a resource in case of conflict or struggles over power, or in connection
with the creation of other rules, and so forth. Such an approach does
not assume that ‘legal’ rules have priority over rules of other provenance
(such as moral or professional rules), which for the actor on the shop
floor may be more pressing reasons for behavior.41
A simple example of the importance of focusing on actors and their
use of (legal) rules – if, that is, one is interested in explanation – is the
matter of legal knowledge. Obviously, an actor whose behavior is covered
by a rule cannot follow it unless he knows of its existence and interprets
it correctly. The same applies to all the other actors whose use of a rule
is an essential part of a practice in which the rule produces social effects:
those, for example, who use it in urging rule-conforming behavior, in
reprimanding or reporting violators, in conflicts with their fellows, in
40 See J. Griffiths, ‘Is Law Important?’, New York University Law Review, 54 (1978), 339–374.
41 See Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Legal Rules’, 1–84.
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drafting protocols and the like incorporating the requirements of the rule
into local regulations, and so forth.
Ultimately, what one needs to know is the difference, if any, that a
given rule makes in social life. Only when one has such information is
comparison of legal systems capable of producing explanations of differ-
ences between them and of change over time. ‘Casting the net wide’ thus
involves looking not only at rules but at actual behavior, and appreciating
the relevance of a range of information that from the perspective of a legal
formalist is not ‘legally relevant’ at all.
Intermediate conclusion
Broad, multi-layered descriptions of legal, cultural and socio-political
contexts of euthanasia in the jurisdictions under review allowed each
system we looked at to express its own individuality. As a result it is
possible for the reader to: (a) have a keen eye for the differences between
the systems (and not just for similarities), and (b) see the comparative
evidence for himself. On this last point, we thought it important that
the reader be allowed to draw his own conclusions from the comparative
evidence we presented, conclusions possibly quite different from our
own.42 Otherwise the neutrality we were striving for would carry the
danger that it be mistaken for absolute neutrality. Neutrality is not just a
problem for the authors but for the reader too. Learning about a foreign
legal system can induce anyone who is not sufficiently self-critical to reflect
on the issues at stake from the perspective of his own native legal system,
making ‘false comparisons’ of his own. All this only affirms the need for a
broad approach: the dangers we are calling attention to can only be kept
under control if one is explicit about one’s assumptions and choices.
Comparison and explanation
In the introduction to this chapter we emphasized that there is no sin-
gle ‘comparative method’ because there is no single question to which
legal comparison can be addressed. We believe one only chases a will-o’-
the-wisp if one tries to find a methodology for doing comparative legal
research, or to decide what counts as similarities or differences, or to
overcome a gap between goals and methods, and so forth, in the abstract,
42 Compare V. V. Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando’, 278.
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not connected to some (sort of) concrete question. We noted in the intro-
duction that in the case of our research concerning the regulation of
MBPSL we wanted to be able to explain the regulatory phenomena we
observed. Even if no absolute certainty, comparison can provide at least
more explanatory power and evidence than enquiries that limit them-
selves to one legal system.43
In Euthanasia and Law in Europe we explore en passant a whole variety of
differences between the countries dealt with (for example, the differences
between the very general terms of the Dutch euthanasia law and the highly
detailed terms of the Belgian law; the difference in the degree to which
‘advance directives’ are honored in countries like the Netherlands and
Belgium, on the one hand, and France and Italy on the other). At the
end of the book we focus specifically on several particularly important
explanatory questions. Some of these relate to processes of legal change
(for example, whether there is evidence of a ‘slippery slope’ and why
(or why not); which European countries seem most likely to legalize
euthanasia in the near future and why). Another important question
concerns the more general context in which legalization of euthanasia is
taking place: is this one of increasing liberty for doctors and patients, or
rather one of increasing legal control? Since we obviously cannot deal here
with all of the questions we tried to answer with a comparative method,
we take this last question as an example.
A normal person in any other country, upon hearing that euthanasia
has been made legal in the Netherlands and Belgium, could be excused
for supposing that what has happened is that existing rules prohibiting
euthanasia have been eliminated, that is, that in a general sort of sense,
there is ‘less law’ on the subject now than there was before legalization.
On the other hand, the oft-heard fear of ‘juridification’ of the doctor-
patient relationship assumes that more and more law regulates it – that
the ‘rule pressure’ (to use a current Dutch expression) is increasing, and
that this is particularly worrisome in an area of life that is too delicate
to bear the weight of so much law. But how to measure ‘how much’ law
there is, is not immediately apparent. We approached that problem in
a rather rough and ready way, using Black’s idea that the ‘quantity of
law’ can be measured in terms of ‘the number and scope of prohibitions,
43 Cf. G. Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?’, in M.
Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford
University Press, 2006), pp. 398–399.
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obligations and other standards to which people are subject, and by the
rate of legislation, litigation, and adjudication’.44
Black’s theory tells us to expect more law where there is greater inequal-
ity of wealth, where social bonds between members of society are looser,
where the degree of social integration is lower, and where other forms of
social control over the behavior concerned are weaker. As far as euthana-
sia is concerned, however, Black’s theory seems to point in precisely the
wrong direction. All of his variables would lead us to expect less law on
the subject in the Netherlands and Belgium than elsewhere. In fact, quite
the opposite is true, especially in the Netherlands. In Euthanasia and Law
in Europe, we show in some detail that the amount of official application
of legal control to doctors who perform euthanasia has grown enormously
over the past decade (it is now about 4,000 cases per year), that the ‘rule
pressure’ (the number of rules – ‘legal’ and otherwise – to which the
behavior is subject) is heavy, and that doctors and institutions apply
the relevant rules more than 30,000 times a year. Apart from Belgium,
there is nothing like this amount of law in any other country.
A more hopeful theoretical approach to explaining the fact that there is
much more euthanasia law where it is legal than where it is illegal is Elias’s
‘civilization theory’.45 Elias sought to explain the growth of social control
concerning violence and good manners over the past 1,000 years or so of
European history. In his footsteps, Kapteyn studied the cultural changes
of the 1970s in the Netherlands. One chapter in Kapteyn’s book Taboo,
Power and Morality in the Netherlands46 is devoted to the collapse of the
taboo on nudity in public, in particular on beaches. Kapteyn argues that
whereas the defenders of traditional Dutch cultural values regarded the
whole development as an instance of a more general collapse of civilized
order, the fact of the matter was that elimination of an unqualified taboo
lead to more rules and more control than there had ever been before. There
is, for example, on an old-fashioned beach, hardly a need for special rules
about how people look at each other. On nude beaches, however, such
rules quickly arose and were effectively – if informally – enforced.
It seems, thus, that the decline of an unqualified general prohibition
of a given sort of behavior gives rise to the need for much more specific
44 D. Black, The Behavior of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
45 See N. Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and
Civilization (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
46 P. Kapteyn, Taboe, ontwikkelingen in macht en moraal in Nederland (Amsterdam: De
Arbeiderspers, 1980).
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regulation, dealing with when, how, and subject to what restrictions the
previously forbidden sort of behavior is acceptable. Taking the idea of
‘law’ broadly, the end of a taboo brings more law, not less. The Dutch
and the Belgians have not freed their doctors from constraints that bind
their colleagues in other countries. On the contrary, they have subjected
the behavior of doctors to much more law than used to be the case, and
to much more than it attracts elsewhere.
There is a longer-term sociological logic at work here, and the word
‘juridification’ that we used to describe the increase in the quantity of
law was meant to evoke it. Legalization of euthanasia and the increase
in the quantity of law that accompanies it are not isolated phenomena.
They are part of a much more general process of ‘juridification’ of the
doctor-patient relationship. This more general process is manifest in all
sorts of developments, of which we mention just a few to give an idea of
what we have in mind: the requirement of informed consent, the legal
recognition of advance directives, the legal acceptance and regulation of
decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment, the burgeoning of medical
guidelines, standards and protocols, and so forth.47
With all this in mind, we can better understand the fact, that in the years
after the Dutch Supreme Court had held that euthanasia can be legally
justifiable, a substantial number of Dutch doctors remained unwilling
to report cases of euthanasia as required because they believed that the
state should not be involved in regulating euthanasia at all: it was some-
thing that belonged to the authority of the doctor and the privacy of the
doctor-patient relationship. The initial opposition of the Belgian Order of
Physicians to the proposal to legalize euthanasia is likewise understand-
able from such a perspective. Legalization was not necessary, a spokesman
stated during legislative hearings to the Belgian Senate, because up till then
Belgian doctors practiced euthanasia whenever they thought it appropri-
ate and never experienced any interference from the legal authorities.
What the law really proposed to do, he argued, was to impose a legal
regulatory regime on the decision making of doctors and patients. We
can summarize this reflection on the legal change that has taken place in
the Netherlands and in Belgium in one sentence: He was absolutely right.
Our ultimate conclusion from this reflection on some of the findings
of our research is that the most fruitful way of looking at the process of
legalization of euthanasia may be to see this not only or even principally
47 To refrain from the all too obvious, we do not even go into the so-called ‘explosion’ in
malpractice litigation.
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as a matter of liberation of doctors and patients from an existing taboo.
Rather, one should see it as the subjection to systematic legal control of
behavior that had long been taking place with some frequency (and there
is much evidence for this) but – precisely because it was taboo – in secret
and outside of all societal control.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have rejected the idea that there is a single ‘comparative
legal method’. We regard legal comparison rather as a means available to
those who seek to answer various sorts of questions about law. When
the question being asked concerns the explanation of differences in law
between different jurisdictions, we have argued that what we call ‘func-
tional comparison’ and ‘casting the net wide’ is essential. This involves
all the elements we discussed in part 3 of this chapter. The data that such
an approach produces can then, in combination with some theory of law
or of legal change, be put to work to solve an explanatory question of
the general type: Why here but not there? Why now but not then? How
should we understand where we are and where we are heading?
Rejecting the notion of ‘the’ comparative method, and insisting on
‘functional’ comparison and ‘casting the net wide’, is obviously not a
prescription for making the life of a comparatist easy. We can therefore
anticipate a reaction along the lines of: such demands are beyond the
means and capacities of mere mortals. Of course that is so. We do not
pretend that in the examples given in this chapter, or in the rest of our
work, we come near to fulfilling the requirements we here lay down.
Nor do we expect that anyone else will ever be able to do so, unless the
question he seeks to answer is so simple as to be uninteresting. What we
do propose is an ideal against which the performance of ordinary mortals
can be measured, by themselves and by others. But in doing one’s daily
work (and in being charitable to others) one must never lose sight of the
most fundamental methodological rule of all: row with the oars you have.
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